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Abstract
Analogical reasoning is a complex cognitive activity that involves access and retrieval of
pre-existing knowledge in order to find a suitable solution. Prior work has shown that analog-
ical transfer and reasoning can be influenced by unconscious activation of relevant informa-
tion. Based on this idea, we report two experiments that examine whether reduced access
to relevant information in memory may further disrupt analogical reasoning unwittingly. In
both experiments, we use an adaptation of the retrieval practice paradigm [1] to modulate
memory accessibility of potential solutions to a subsequent set of analogy problems of the
type ‘A is to B as C is to ?’. Experiment 1 showed a retrieval-induced impairment in analogi-
cal problem solving. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that it cannot be
due to the deliberative episodic retrieval of the solutions to the analogies. These findings,
predictable from an inhibitory framework of memory control, provide a new focus for theories
of analogical transfer and highlight the importance of unconscious memory processes that
may modulate problem solving.
Introduction
Memory plays a prominent role in our everyday reasoning activities by allowing us to access
relevant past experiences, which could thus be applied to new situations [2]. In the context of
problem solving, considerable attention has received the way in which we access, retrieve and
use stored knowledge to solve new problems [3–7]. Much of this research has focused on
inductive reasoning processes such as analogical thinking, which involves generating novel
connections and transferring information from a well-known domain to a new one on the
basis of similarities and correspondences [8]. Analogical reasoning is seen as a fundamental
tool in a wide variety of problem-solving contexts such as scientific discovery [9], mathematics
[10,11] or creative problem solving [12]. In all these contexts, memory plays a central role
since information from one domain has to be accessed and applied to a different one. For
instance, ‘the solar system’ analogy has been used to explain the atomic structure (how a planet
orbits the sun can be thought as analogous to the way in which an electron orbits an atomic
nucleus), but this analogy only can be inferred if the person already knows about and have
access to the stored information regarding the structure of the solar system [13]. There is
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considerable support for the claim that memory accessibility is crucial in analogical thinking;
namely, the relevant source idea and potential analogies must be accessed, selected and
retrieved from all the related information stored in long-term memory in order to map them
and generate new inferences [14].
A growing body of literature has started to examine how memory accessibility may influence
analogical reasoning [3,15–18]. Since memory is a dynamic process, there are mechanisms that
can either facilitate or hinder access to the information stored in long-term memory and, thus,
have an indirect influence on the reasoning process. A key issue concerns the degree to which
participants spontaneously access and use relevant information during analogical reasoning.
Hence, in some experiments, participants are exposed to information that would be useful for a
subsequent problem-solving task without being informed about the relevance of the provided
information. Even though research has demonstrated that people often fail to take advantage of
this information [4,5,19], a number of studies have also found evidence of how prior activated
knowledge impact reasoning and problem solving [2,9,17,20–22].
However, there is some controversy on whether the possible impact of previous knowledge
can influence analogical reasoning in both explicit and implicit manners. For example, it has
been argued that awareness of encoding and retrieval processes is required to flexible applica-
tion of knowledge in successful analogical transfer [23,24]. In this line, some studies have used
explicit cues to prompt participants to remember analogous previous problems as a way of
increasing transfer effects [4,5,10,19,25]. Gick and Holyoak [5], for example, had participants
generate a solution to treat a tumor without using radiation that would destroy the surround-
ing tissue. In the control condition where no analogical source was presented, only a 10% of
participants came up with the solution. When previously provided with a similar solution but
applied in a different incidental context without any hint that they could use the solution to
approach the target problem, about 30% of participants generated analogous solutions. Nota-
bly, when these participants were explicitly told that remembering the previous story might be
helpful to produce a solution to the problem, the percentage of convergence solutions
increased to 80%. These results suggest that spontaneous access to potential useful analogies
may be difficult even when they are available in memory, unless explicit cues are provided.
In contrast, recent studies have shown that analogical mapping may act without an explicit
prompt and without awareness of how solutions become accessible [2,9,17,20–22]. For exam-
ple, in Gross and Greene’s [22] study participants learned a control sequence of faces (A>B,
B>C, where A>C is usually inferred) or a transverse pattern set (A>B, B>C and C>A). Then,
they learned a partial set of new faces (X>Y and Y>Z) and were tested for transfer on the new
pair (X?Z). The group that was exposed to the transverse pattern C>A adopted the transverse
pattering relations and selected Z>X at a greater extent than the control group, which rarely
chose that pattern. Importantly, analogical transfer occurred even though participants were
not explicitly prompted to do so and in the absence of awareness. Moreover, unconscious ana-
logical thinking has been observed in a variety of context such as problem solving [9,21], text
comprehension [20], false memories [17] and in absence of deliberate analogical strategies
[22]. In problem-solving contexts, for example, Schunn and Dunbar [9] showed that knowl-
edge about a domain could enhance performance of a reasoning problem from a different
domain through implicit priming. In their experiment, participants were first asked to solve a
biochemistry problem by discovering which viruses were in a dormant state as a consequence
of an inhibitory process. In a second session, participants solved an unrelated molecular genet-
ics problem whose solution involved inhibition of a set of genes. Both biochemistry and molec-
ular genetics problems solutions involved the same concept of inhibition. The authors found
that participants that were initially exposed to the biochemistry problem were more likely to
propose the concept of inhibition to solve the second problem and solved it faster than control
Inhibitory control during selective retrieval may hinder subsequent analogical thinking
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211881 February 12, 2019 2 / 18
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
participants. Furthermore, participants reported not to be aware of the relationship of the solu-
tions between the two tasks. Similarly, Day and Goldstone [21] found evidence of analogical
transfer of strategies between two unrelated tasks. Participants who first learned how to solve a
concrete perceptual simulation of a physical system were better at solving a task with very dis-
similar domain and appearance, which involved an analogous structure and strategy. In addi-
tion, the transfer was independent of the participants’ explicit reports about their awareness of
the application of the analogous strategy.
Other results suggest that false memories could also prime problem solving and reasoning
tasks as true memories do. Howe, Garner, Threadgold and Ball [17] primed solutions in ana-
logical problem solving by exposing participants to Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists.
In a standard DRM experiment, participants first study a list of words that are associates (e.g.,
tiger, circus, tamer, roar. . .) of a critical semantically related item (e.g., lion), which is never
presented at the study. After a retention interval, the participants’ memory for the studied
words is tested. The usual result is that participants produce or endorse the critical lure as a
previously studied word as a consequence of the semantic relatedness between studied words
and critical lures. In Howe et al.’s [17] study, after a free recall test, participants solved analo-
gies of the type ‘A is to B as C is to D’ in which they had to generate the ‘D’ term (e.g., peace is
to dove as courage is to ?). Some of the analogies’ solutions were critical lures of the DRM lists
(false memory primed solutions, e.g., lion), whereas the remaining solutions were neither
included in the lists nor related to them (unprimed solutions). Results revealed that partici-
pants solved significantly more analogies whose solutions were primed by false memories (crit-
ical lures) than analogies whose solutions were not primed. When participants were
questioned on whether they noticed the two tasks were related, most reported that they did
not think that there was a connection between the two phases. Taken together, these results
seem to suggest that prior activation of knowledge by an unrelated task may make relevant
information more readily accessible for solving analogical problems. Thus, presenting certain
pieces of information has the potential to prime access to related information and implicitly
enhance analogical thinking.
The question here, however, is whether situations that temporarily render relevant memo-
ries inaccessible might, in turn, hinder analogical problem solving. Given that the generation
of potential solutions relies on access to memory, if potential solutions are made less accessible
and harder to retrieve during problem solving, performance should be impaired. Hence, any
process that reduces the accessibility of relevant information in memory might hamper ana-
logical reasoning. A control mechanism that is thought to decrease activation of memory rep-
resentations is inhibition, which would be in charge of downregulating irrelevant but
competing memories to facilitate access to relevant ones [1]. The role of inhibitory control as a
mechanism to overcome interference during episodic retrieval has been extensively studied
with the retrieval practice (RP) procedure. In this procedure, participants engage in practicing
retrieval of only some of the previously studied items. While this selective retrieval usually
leads to better accessibility (enhanced recall/recognition) of practiced items, it also causes the
temporary inaccessibility (worse recall/recognition as compared to control items) of related
non-practiced items that compete for retrieval during practice. According to an inhibitory
framework (i.e., [26–30]), this retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) phenomenon is the aftereffect
of inhibitory control exerted during selective retrieval, so that competing information that was
previously inhibited remains in a below-baseline activation state that renders it less accessible
if, later, this information becomes relevant and has to be retrieved. While most research on
RIF has been conducted by using recall and recognition tasks to look into the consequences of
inhibitory control (for reviews, see [31,32]), the retrieval practice (RP) procedure has also
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proved to be an useful tool to study the influence of memory activation and inhibition on
thinking and decision making.
For example, Iglesias-Parro and Gómez-Ariza [33] found that participants’ judgments
about the suitability of imaginary prospective candidates for employment could be biased by
means of reduced access to relevant information. In their study, they used an adapted version
of the retrieval practice paradigm [1] so that participants were first presented candidates for a
telephone insurance seller job position who were described with relevant (i.e. nice voice or ver-
bal fluency) and irrelevant (i.e. tall or single) attributes. Then, participants practiced retrieval
of irrelevant attributes related to one of the candidates. Lastly, participants were asked to
choose the best candidate for the job position before a final memory test. As expected, partici-
pants selected the candidate whose irrelevant attributes were not selectively retrieved, so show-
ing selective forgetting of the competing applicant’s relevant attributes. Hence, making a
decision in the context of a personnel selection task was biased by means of the retrieval-
induced inhibition of job applicants’ traits. Consistent with this finding, one recent study also
demonstrated that creative thinking might be adversely affected by reduced accessibility to rel-
evant information [34].
Taken together, these findings suggest that reduced access to relevant representations in
memory would result in poor performance in any problem-solving task as long as it strongly
relies on memory accessibility. With the aim of putting to an empirical test this idea, the pres-
ent experiments focus on analogical reasoning. The idea is that if potential solutions become
less accessible from memory as an aftereffect of selective retrieval (i.e., via inhibitory control),
subsequent performance on analogical problems should be impaired. Of special relevance
here, given the controversy regarding whether modulating accessibility of previous knowledge
can implicitly influence analogical reasoning [23,24], we designed the present experiments so
that if any, the possible negative effect of selective retrieval on analogical reasoning did not rely
on explicit retrieval of previously presented information. Thus, we did our best to avoid that
participants noticed the connection between the retrieval practice and the problem solving
phases.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 aimed to determine whether memory accessibility might unconsciously impact
analogical problem solving. Specifically, we were interested in exploring whether items that
had previously been the target of inhibitory control during selective retrieval were less likely to
be chosen as solutions in an analogical reasoning task. To this end, the RP paradigm [1] was
adapted to manipulate the accessibility of candidate words as solutions for subsequent analogy
problems. In the standard RP paradigm, participants typically study a list of category-exemplar
pairs (e.g., Fruit-Banana, Fruit-Melon, Furniture-Shelving, Furniture-Wardrobe). Then, they
are asked to selectively retrieve half of the items of half of the categories by a given a cue (e.g.,
Fruit-Ba____). Finally, a recall (or recognition) test is administered for all the studied items.
As previously mentioned, selective retrieval usually facilitates later recall of practiced (Banana)
items compared to control items (unrelated and unpracticed; Shelving and Wardrobe). On the
contrary, unpracticed related items (Melon) are worse recalled than control items, which may
be understood as an aftereffect of inhibitory control that acted on these competing items in
memory during the selective retrieval of practiced items (e.g., [26,32,35]).
With the idea of exploring if memory inhibition may also affect analogical thinking, in the
present experiments we replaced the final memory test typically used in the RP procedure with
a set of analogical problems whose solutions matched some of the studied words. The analogi-
cal problems consisted of four-term analogies of the type ‘A is to B as C is to D’ generally
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employed in standardized intelligence and vocabulary knowledge tests [36]. In this type of
analogies, the A, B, and C terms are presented and solvers must find the D term to complete
the sentence. That is, the participant had to be able to connect the different terms by finding a
relationship between the two first pair of concepts in order to map it to the third word and
find a suitable solution (e.g., BIRD is to FEATHERS as DOG is to ?). We predicted that to the
extent that selective retrieval leads to the inhibition of competing items in memory, if these
competing items turn out to be potential solutions in a subsequent test of analogical reasoning
the inhibited words should be less accessible and harder to produce as D terms of analogy
problems. This expectation only follows if analogical reasoning makes use of previously acti-
vated/inhibited knowledge in an implicit manner.
Method
Participants. 30 undergraduate students (mean age = 19.67 years; SD = 1.92) from the
University of Granada participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. This sam-
ple size was determined on the basis of the number of participants included in related previous
studies that looked into the effects of selective retrieval on problem solving (e.g., [33,37]). All
participants were native Spanish speaker, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave
their written consent to participate in the experiment by signing the appropriate informed
consent paperwork. The Ethics Committee of the University of Granada approved the proce-
dure of this study.
Materials. We used the items employed by Bajo, Gómez-Ariza, Fernandez and Marful
([38]; see also [29,33]) with some modifications and the addition of new categories and items.
The material consisted of fifty-four Spanish words from nine different orthography-based cat-
egories. Two additional categories of two words each were created and used as fillers at the
beginning and at the end of the study lists in order to control for primacy and recency effects.
Each orthographic category was composed of six (semantically unrelated) words that shared
their first two letters (e.g., Maquillaje, Marinero, Matanza, Madurez, Maleta and Manual for
the category MA). All the words were chosen according to their lexical frequency from the
[39] database. Each category was composed of three medium-high frequency words
(range = 34–98, M = 58.78) and three medium-low frequency words (range = 10–36,
M = 20.15). Medium-low lexical frequency words were used as to-be-practiced (Rp+), unprac-
ticed control (Nrp+) and unprimed (Up+) items depending on the across-participants coun-
terbalance condition. Medium-high lexical frequency words were used as related unpracticed
(competing) items (Rp-), unpracticed control (Nrp-) items, or unprimed words (Up-) also
depending upon the counterbalance version. As in previous RIF studies, the idea was to have
competitive enough (high-frequency) Rp- items to maximize the need of inhibitory control
during the phase of selective retrieval of the (low-frequency) Rp+ items ([26]; See also [38]).
Moreover, the words selected (a) did not share apparent semantic relationship among the
words belonging to the same category (b) were between two and five syllable lengths and (c)
had a unique third letter. Six counterbalanced versions of the study material were created and
used across participants so that every category rotated and appeared in the practiced, unprac-
ticed, and non-studied conditions. In each version, three categories were studied and practiced
(i.e., BA, DE, MA) and produced Rp+ and Rp- items; three categories were studied but not
practiced and produced Nrp+ and Nrp- control items (i.e., CA, PE, FA) and the last three cate-
gories were unstudied and produced Up+ and Up- unprimed items (i.e., DI, RE, TA).
Fifty-four analogical reasoning problems of the logical type A:B::C:D (A is to B as C is to ?)
used in standardized tests were created (e.g., Miller Analogies Test (MAT) or Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT); [40,41]). Each problem could be solved with one of the fifty-four words from
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the nine categories described above (AVARICIA es a GENEROSIDAD como INFANTI-
LISMO a . . . whose solution would be MADUREZ; GREED is to GENEROSITY as INFAN-
TILISM is to. . ., for MATURITY). Most of the relationships between the pairs of terms (A to B
and C to D) were based on synonymy, antonymy, part to whole, cause and effect, degree,
exemplar- category and object-action relations. Analogy problems were constructed taking
into account associative strengths (forward and backward associative strength < .20) accord-
ing to Spanish free association norms [42,43]. Analogies were chosen from a preliminary nor-
mative study in which 57 participants were asked to provide a solution to each problem. The
study was conducted to ensure that the experimental items had an appropriate difficulty level.
Hence, only those analogies with a success rate ranging from 20% to 80% were selected (for a
similar criterion see [17]). The mean percentage of correctly solved analogies was 44.73%
(SD = 19.75). The nine categories were split into three different sets (BA-DE-MA, CA-PE-FA
and DI-RE-FA) to be used in each of the counterbalance conditions as practiced (Rp+ and Rp-
items), control (Nrp+ and Nrp- items) or unstudied (Up+ and Up- items) categories. The sets
were matched for difficulty level so that there were no reliable differences between them
(Group BA-DE-MA mean accuracy = 41.90; Group CA-PE-FA mean accuracy = 48.34; Group
DI- RE-TA mean accuracy = 45.02; p> .05).
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six counterbalanced condi-
tions and were tested individually. They were told that they would participate in two different
and separate experiments; one concerning memory and the other related to analogical think-
ing. Hence, there was not an explicit link between the studied words and the analogy problems.
The experimental session went through three main phases: study, retrieval practice and ana-
logical problems test.
Study phase. In this first phase, participants were asked to memorize, for an upcoming
memory test, word pairs composed of a lexical category represented by the two first letters (syl-
lable) of a set of words and a word that belonged to that category (e.g., BA-Balanza). They were
told to pay special attention to the first syllable of the word that identified the category to
which the word belonged because this category would be used as a retrieval cue in the upcom-
ing memory test. Each pair was presented in the center of the screen for 5 s with a 1 s inter-
stimulus interval. Four pairs were used as fillers and appeared at the beginning and at the end
of the list to reduce primacy and recency effects. Thirty-six experimental pairs (6 out of the 9
possible categories) plus the filler ones were presented twice with each pair in each list pre-
sented in random order.
Retrieval practice phase. In this phase, participants were asked to repeatedly recall words
of the previous phase. In each trial, a fixation cross was presented followed by the category
label (e.g., CA) for 2 s and then the first three letters of the target word (e.g., Car_____) for 6 s.
Participants were asked to recall aloud the studied word which matched with the cue. Only
half of the items from half of the studied categories were presented during selective retrieval,
which makes a total of nine Rp+ items. They were presented in separate blocks of three words
with a filler item at the beginning and the end of each block. The blocks were displayed five
times in a pseudorandom order. At the end of this phase, participants completed a distractor
task for 5 minutes (completion of basic arithmetical operations; e.g., 3 x 2 + 6).
Analogical thinking phase. At the end of the session, participants were instructed to
solve analogy problems by finding the relationship between A and B, and by thinking of a
word that was related to C in the same way. No reference was made to the previously studied
materials and participants were engaged in this phase as part of a different experiment.
They were first given examples of how to solve analogy problems and then provided with
two practice problems with solutions. Then, the analogical test started. On each trial, the anal-
ogy was presented in the center of the computer screen for a maximum of one minute.
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Participants were asked to come up with a solution aloud and press the space bar afterward. A
total of 54 analogical problems were presented. 36 analogies related to the words studied in the
first phase. Eighteen additional problems were not related to any of the studied words and
were added as fillers that represented problems with unprimed solutions. Analogies were pre-
sented randomly in two separate blocks in order to control for output order effects. First, a
block including problems whose possible solutions were related to unpracticed, unrelated
unpracticed (control) and unstudied words (Rp-, Nrp- and Up-, respectively) was presented.
Then, a block with problems for which the solution word corresponded with practiced, control
and unstudied words (Rp+, Nrp+ and Up+) was presented. Each analogy was scored with
either 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect or unsolved) by using a two different scoring procedures:
namely, a strict scoring criterion (the response to each analogy was considered correct only if
it exactly matched the target word on the study list) to minimize bias during scoring, and a
lenient criterion (the response was considered correct as long as it was similar (i.e., a synonym)
of the exact word they studied at the first phase).
Finally, participants were given a questionnaire to learn about the strategies they used
during each phase (study, retrieval practice and analogical problem solving) and whether
they were aware of the relationship between the memory task and the analogy problems.
The entire experimental session lasted approximately one hour, depending on the partici-
pants’ speed to solve the problems. Presentation of the items in the experiment was con-
trolled by E-prime 2.0 [44].
Results and discussion
The mean percentage of success during the retrieval practice phase was 61.11 (SD = 25.06) and
the mean percentage of analogies that were correctly solved was 54.32% (SD = 10.09), which
reflect a relatively good general performance on the tasks. Fig 1 shows mean percentages of
correctly solved analogies and solution times for each type of item. Two separate repeated-
measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed on the percentage of analogy prob-
lems correctly solved with studied items and on reaction times.
Retrieval-induced impairment effect. To assess the negative effect of retrieval practice
on analogical problem solving we conducted an ANOVA with type of item (Rp-, Nrp- and
Up-) as the factor and accuracy rates as the dependent variable. The analysis applying a strict
scoring criteria showed a reliable effect of type of item F(2, 58) = 5.118, MSE = 1444.44, p =
.009, ηp
2 = .15. Follow-up comparisons revealed that participants solved significantly fewer
analogies with Rp- words (M = 51.48, SD = 21.14) than with Nrp- items (M = 61.48,
SD = 18.16), t(29) = -2.162, p = .039, d = 0.51, indicating that unpracticed words that were
related to practiced items were less generated as solutions than unpracticed control items. In
addition, Nrp- items (M = 61.48, SD = 18.16) were reliably more generated as solutions than
Up- items (M = 48.15, SD = 18.30), t(29) = 3.19, p< .01, d = 0.73, which reveals a priming
effect in analogical problem solving. Finally, there was no reliable difference between Rp-
(M = 51.48, SD = 21.14) and Up- items (M = 48.15, SD = 18.30) (t(29) < 1, p = .43, d = 0.16).
Hence, the retrieval-induced impairment on studied but unpracticed items was comparable to
the effect of not presenting these items for study.
The analysis performed when applying a lenient criterion to score the solutions revealed
exactly the same pattern. Thus, there was a reliable effect of type of item F(2, 58) = 6.25,
MSE = 1400.55, p = .003, ηp2 = .177. T-tests confirmed that analogies were still solved less fre-
quently with Rp- items (M = 58.15, SD = 20.57) than with Nrp items (M = 67.41, SD = 17.73), t
(29) = -2.22, p = .034, d = 0.48. In addition, Nrp- items (M = 67.41, SD = 17.73) were reliably
more generated as solutions than Up- items (M = 54.07, SD = 16.95), t(29) = 3.67, p = .001,
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d = 0.77, and there was no reliable difference between Rp- (M = 58.15, SD = 20.57) and Up-
items (M = 54.07, SD = 16.95), t(29) = 1.076, p = .291, d = 0.22.
A similar ANOVA on reaction times (in ms) when applying the strict scoring criteria failed
to reveal differences between Rp- (M = 7683.93, SD = 3932.69), Nrp- (M = 8332.64,
SD = 3830.08) and Up- items (M = 8125.51, SD = 3871.46), F(2, 58)< 1, MSE = 3293621.58, p
= .52, ηp
2 = .022. We also failed to observe a reliable effect on reaction times when using a
lenient scoring criteria [Rp-: M = 8236.70, SD = 3530.74; Nrp-: M = 8413.03, SD = 4119.79;
Up-: M = 8348.24, SD = 3796.31, F(2, 58)< 1, MSE = 238635.65, p = .94, ηp2 = .002].
Facilitation effect. To evaluate the possible benefit of retrieval practice on analogical
thinking we conducted an ANOVA on accuracy with type of item (Rp+, Nrp+ and Up
+ words) as the repeated-measure factor. The analysis using the strict scoring procedure
revealed a reliable effect, F(2, 58) = 7.14, MSE = 2392.31, p< .01, ηp
2 = .198. Follow-up analy-
ses failed to reveal reliable differences between Rp+ (M = 63.33, SD = 20.03) and unpracticed
(Nrp+) control items [M = 55.92, SD = 18.33), t(29) = 1.55, p = .13, d = 0.39], even though
there was a trend towards better performance for practiced items. We however found a facilita-
tion (priming) effect that resulted from presenting the potential solutions during the first
phase of the experiment since Nrp+ problems (those whose solutions were presented during
study but belonged to unpracticed categories) were better solved (M = 55.93, SD = 18.33) than
the Up+ problems (M = 45.56, SD = 15.54), whose solutions were never presented, t(29) =
2.11, p = .04, d = 0.61. In addition, participants significantly produced more Rp+ solutions
(M = 63.33, SD = 20.03) than Up+ solutions (M = 45.56, SD = 15.54), t(29) = 3.97, p< .01,
d = 0.99. The ANOVA on accuracy when using the lenient scoring procedure the effect of type
of item did not reach significance, although it was close to it [F(2, 58) = 2.83, MSE = 882.03, p
= .07, ηp
2 = .089; Rp+: M = 66.67, SD = 21.04; Nrp+: M = 62.59, SD = 15.02; Up+: M = 55.93,
SD = 16.11].
The ANOVA performed on reaction times data failed to show a reliable effect of type of
item either when using strict [Rp+: M = 7807.93, SD = 3736.11; Nrp+: M = 6486.90,
SD = 2146.71; Up+; M = 7754.53, SD = 3446.54; F(2, 58) = 2.86, MSE = 16774321.83, p = .065,
Fig 1. Performance on the analogical test as a function of the status of the solutions (error bars represent the
standard error of the mean). Rp- = Solutions that were competitors during retrieval practice. Nrp- = Solutions that
were not competitors during retrieval practice. Up- = Solutions that were neither competitors during retrieval practice
nor previously studied.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211881.g001
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ηp
2 = .090] or lenient scoring criteria [Rp+: M = 8027.45, SD = 3731.60; Nrp+: M = 6891.41,
SD = 2319.15; Up+: M = 8113.68, SD = 3036.54, F(2, 58) = 2.43, MSE = 13959872.96, p = .10,
ηp
2 = .077].
In an attempt to better understand performance on the analogy task, we looked whether
success at retrieval practice predicted either overall accuracy at test or impairment for Rp-
items. Pearson correlation analyses failed to showed linear relationships both using the strict (r
= .250, p = .183 and r = -.117, p = .537, respectively) and the lenient scoring procedures (r =
.111, p = .560 and r = -.168, p = .376, respectively). This lack of relationship between retrieval
practice success and final test accuracy is not surprising since literature on RIF has systemati-
cally shown this to be the case (45, 46). Finally, participants’ responses to the questionnaire
indicated that 23 out of the 30 participants (77%) became aware of the connection between the
memory and the problem-solving tasks and recognized that they tried to solve the analogical
problems by recalling the previously studied words. Critically, almost all these participants
(73.33%) reported they were aware of such a relation at the end of the final test, when practiced
(Rp+) items were presented and they noticed these words could be used as solutions. Hence, it
seems reasonable to claim that, at least to some extent, performance during the first block of
problems (whose potential solutions were unpracticed and unstudied items) was scarcely mod-
ulated by conscious retrieval of studied items. Although some studies have reported reliable
RIF effects on response times using recognition memory tests [45], we did not observe any
facilitation/inhibition effects on this measure. Given that our analogy test would require a
number of processes in addition to recognition (such as mapping and evaluation) response
latencies might not be sensitive to the underlying memory control processes involved during
analogical reasoning.
In summary, we found that items that competed for retrieval -and presumably were the tar-
get of inhibitory control during the practice phase- were selected to a lesser extent as solutions
of the analogical problems than control items. This was so in the context of a separate prob-
lem-solving task that most participants failed to connect with the previous stages of the experi-
mental session. Hence, this finding joins previous results to show that the cost of accessibility
that follows selective retrieval may also be observed on tasks requiring more than only recalling
specific episodic memories. Thus, in addition to the impact that memory inhibition has shown
on decision making [33] and the resolution of creativity problems [34], the present results
indicate that retrieval-induced forgetting may also hamper analogical reasoning.
An additional contribution of the present experiment is that it provides a complementary
measure of the disruptive effect that memory inhibition may have on the accessibility to poten-
tial solutions on analogical problem solving. Specifically, here we were able to more precisely
estimate the selective impairment for inhibited solutions by including problems whose poten-
tial solutions were never presented in the context of the experiment. Hence, Up- solutions pro-
vide a baseline measure of the effect of the previous presentation (study) of the items that
could become solutions. Given that the generation of Rp- solutions during analogical thinking
was similar to that for Up- solutions, we interpret that inhibitory control during selective
retrieval lowered the accessibility of competing memories so that participants behaved as if
Rp- solutions had not been previously presented.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that reduced access to previously inhibited information
influenced analogical problem solving by reducing the probability of coming up with a solu-
tion if it was previously inhibited during selective retrieval. In designing Experiment 1, we
assumed that the access to targets to solve analogies might be implicit, since we made a serious
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effort through instructions to separate the memory and analogy tasks by making participants
believe that these tasks were completely independent of each other. Despite this, most partici-
pants reported that they ended up being aware of the possibility of using the studied words to
solve the problems. Hence, it could be the case that rather than testing whether inhibition of
relevant information could implicitly affect performance on the analogical test, we were
directly assessing episodic memory. That is, during problem solving participants could have
attempted to think back on the words previously studied in order to solve analogies without
genuinely applying analogical mapping processes. This would especially be so for the Rp+ criti-
cal items, which were repeatedly presented during the practice phase of the experiment. Inter-
estingly, in our procedure the analogies that could be solved with practiced (Rp+) and
unpracticed (Rp- and Nrp-) items were presented in two different blocks. Thus, participants
first attempted to solve Rp- and Nrp- analogies and then moved to the block with analogies
whose solutions could be Rp+ and Nrp+ items. Therefore, those who reported awareness of
the relationship between the two tasks at the half or the end of the problem-solving test might
have noticed the connection while they were solving the second block of analogies. If so, they
might have thought back only during the second testing block. In order to better determine to
what extent participants implicitly accessed potential solutions to solve the analogies without
explicitly using episodic retrieval, we conducted a second experiment where the procedure for
the study and practice phases was identical to that used in Experiment 1, but the analogical test
only included analogies that could be solved with Rp-, Nrp- and Up- items. Hence, partici-
pants were not given problems whose potential solutions were Rp+, Nrp+ and Up+ items. We
expected this testing procedure to minimize the participants’ awareness of the relationship
between the memory and the reasoning stages of the experimental session. The new procedure
would allow us to replicate the main finding of Experiment 1 as well as to precise to what
extent participants may deal with analogy problems without noticing the above-mentioned
relationship.
Method
Participants. Based on the results obtained in Experiment 1, and before starting to con-
duct Experiment 2, we decided to have the same sample size in the present experiment. Thus,
thirty undergraduate students (mean age = 19.87 years; SD = 1.45) from the University of Gra-
nada participated in the experiment for course credit. None of them had participated in the
previous study. All participants were native Spanish speaker, had normal or corrected-to-nor-
mal vision and gave their written consent to participate in the experiment by signing the
appropriate informed consent paperwork. The Ethics Committee of the University of Granada
approved the procedure of this study.
Material and procedure. The material and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1,
except that in the final (problem solving) test participants only solved analogies whose solu-
tions corresponded to Rp-, Nrp- and Up- items.
Results and discussion
Only 8 (27% of the) participants reported being aware of the relation between the memory and
the analogy tasks, which indicates that the present procedure was successful (in comparison to
that of Experiment 1; two samples proportion test with p< 0.01) at enhancing the implicit
nature of the analogical test. These eight participants exhibited a totally different pattern of
performance on the problem-solving test in comparison to the remaining participants. Specifi-
cally, they produced more Rp- (M = 73.61, SD = 10.18) than Nrp- solutions (M = 59.72,
SD = 10.18) to the problems, even though a Wilcoxon test failed to reveal a reliable effect.
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Hence, eliminating problems related to Rp+ items from the analogical test drastically reduced
awareness of the relation between the different stages of the experiment. Since we wanted to
assure that the results were not due to explicit memory strategies, the data from the eight par-
ticipants who noticed the relationship between the two tasks were removed from the analyses.
It is worth mentioning that these participants explicitly indicated that they attempted to recall
words from the memory task to solve analogies.
The mean percentage of recall at the retrieval practice phase was 70.20 (SD = 22.32), while
the mean percentage of correctly solved problems was 39.31 (SD = 13.88). Neither accuracy
rates during analogical reasoning nor RIF scores correlated with retrieval practice success (r =
.127, p = .574; r = -.290, p = .190, respectively). Fig 1 shows the mean percentages of correctly
solved analogies and solution times as a function of the type of solution (Rp-, Nrp- and Up-).
Retrieval-induced impairment effect. A repeated-measures ANOVA on accuracy using the
strict scoring procedure showed a reliable effect of type of item (Rp-, Nrp- and Up-), F(2, 42) =
4.89, MSE = 995.14, p = .01, ηp
2 = .189. T-tests confirmed that participants came up with fewer
Rp- items (M = 37.37, SD = 18.32) than Nrp- items (M = 49.49, SD = 16.7) to solve analogies, t
(21) = -2.767, p = .012, d = 0.69. Nrp- solutions (M = 49.49, SD = 16.7) were more produced
than Up- solutions (M = 38.38, SD = 19.31), t(21) = 2.499, p = .021, d = 0.62, which again dem-
onstrates the effect of exposing potential solutions to participants. Also like in Experiment 1,
no statistical difference was observed between Rp- (M = 37.37, SD = 18.32) and Up- solutions
(M = 38.38, SD = 19.31), t(21) = -.249, p = .806, d = .05, indicating that even though Rp- items
were presented at study, they behaved as if they had never been presented in the context of the
experiment. The ANOVA performed on accuracy when applying the lenient scoring criterion
also showed a reliable effect of item type, F(2, 42) = 9.14, MSE = 1060.60, p = .001, ηp
2 = .303.
Follow-up analysis showed that participants generated fewer Rp- items (M = 42.93,
SD = 16.19) as solutions to the analogies compared to Nrp- items (M = 56.57, SD = 14.10), t
(21) = -4.29, p = .000, d = 0.90. In addition, Nrp- items (M = 56.57, SD = 14.10) were reliably
more generated as solutions than Up- items (M = 47.47, SD = 17.88), t(21) = 3.15, p< .005,
d = 0.57, which again reveals a priming effect in analogical problem solving. Finally, there was
no reliable difference between Rp- (M = 42.93, SD = 16.19) and Up- items (M = 47.47,
SD = 17.88) (t(21) = -1.25, p = .22, d = 0.26). Hence, the retrieval-induced impairment on stud-
ied but unpracticed items was comparable to the effect of not presenting these items for study.
The ANOVA performed on reaction times failed to show a significant effect [F(2, 42) = 1.19,
MSE = 11552788.20, p = .165, ηp
2 = .082; Rp-: M = 6773.50, SD = 3144.04; Nrp-: M = 8189.96,
SD = 1950.71; Up-: M = 7216.01, SD = 3849.35]. The same null effect emerged when using the
lenient scoring criteria [Rp-: M = 8633.51, SD = 2986.51; Nrp-: M = 9515.41, SD = 4004.48; Up-:
M = 9130.52, SD = 3056.44, F(2, 42)< 1, MSE = 1748769.37, p = .44, ηp2 = .038].
In summary, and replicating Experiment 1, Experiment 2 reveals that items that putatively
had been the target of inhibitory control were significantly less chosen as solutions than con-
trol items in an independent analogical test. Moreover, inhibited words were produced to the
same degree than unstudied (unprimed) words. Since in the present experiment additional
measures were taken to minimize participants’ awareness about the connection between the
memory and the reasoning tasks, these results suggest that the modulation of the accessibility
by means of inhibitory mechanisms may impair analogical thinking implicitly.
General discussion
Current evidence suggests that prior exposure to relevant information can foster analogical
problem solving by increasing the accessibility to appropriate knowledge [9,17,21]. In the pres-
ent work, we aimed to further explore the relationship between memory and analogical thinking
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from a different angle; namely, that reduced access to critical information may adversely affect
performance on an analogical thinking task. The results of two experiments support this idea.
Capitalizing on an experimental procedure (retrieval practice) that has systematically
shown to be effective to reduce memory accessibility (for a meta-analytic review see [46]), we
conducted two experiments wherein participants engaged in solving analogical problems of
the type ‘A is to B as C is to D’ after selectively retrieving part of previously encoded items.
Since selective retrieval is known to lead to forgetting (a direct measure of reduced accessibil-
ity) of memories that are related to those selectively recalled, we expected selective retrieval to
negatively modulate analogical thinking performance provided that the forgotten information
turned out to be relevant during problem solving. In this line, we systematically found that
related unpracticed (Rp-) words were less chosen as solutions than unrelated control (Nrp-)
words to solve analogies. To put it another way, the analogy problems that could potentially be
solved with the less accessible items turned out to be more difficult to solve. Importantly, this
was the case in two experiments even when participants were not aware that some of the solu-
tions that they generated to solve the problems had been previously presented. Hence, the
present results are consistent with others from previous studies that have examined the influ-
ence of memory control processes over performance in tests of verbal creativity [34], or deci-
sion making [33,47] (for related studies see the meta-analytic review by [47]). In fact, [34]
reported similar results regarding how reduced access to relevant information may impair cre-
ative thinking. In a series of experiments, participants studied a set of words and then repeat-
edly practiced a subset of them. Finally, participants were told to solve problems from a
Remote Associates Test (RAT). The RAT is a creativity verbal test in which solvers are pre-
sented with three unrelated words and they are asked to find a fourth word that is associated
with the three unrelated presented words (e.g., for fish-mine-rush, a correct solution could be
gold). Words that had previously been the putative target of inhibitory control (by virtue of
selective retrieval) were generated to a lesser extent than creative solutions relative to baseline
items. Therefore, all these studies are informative of how reduced accessibility to relevant
information may impact on thinking, with the present experiment demonstrating for the first
time that this also applies to analogical reasoning.
As previously mentioned, a remarkable point of the present experiments is that they were
designed to keep participants’ awareness of episodic retrieval to a minimum during problem
solving. Analogical thinking has often been viewed as an intentional analytic process [16]. Peo-
ple must deliberately search through potential, and often irrelevant, solutions in memory that
can be implemented to the current situation. As mentioned, some have argued that the pres-
ence of explicit cues are required to apply previously activated potential solutions to analogical
problem solving for successful transfer [23,24]. However some studies also suggest analogical
transfer could also occur without explicit cues and without awareness that potential solution
was previously presented [2,9,17,20–22]. Along this line, the main finding of the present exper-
iments indicates that information involved in a memory task may later influence how accu-
rately people deal with analogical problems and, what is of special relevance here, do so
unwittingly. In Experiment 1 almost all the participants reported being aware that some of the
solutions they produced were words that had previously appeared in the experimental session.
However, most of them noticed the relation between the two sessions at the half/end of the test
when practiced words (Rp+, and their controls Nrp+ and Up+) were presented. Hence, it
seems reasonable to think that solutions produced during the first block (containing the most
relevant items here: Rp-, Nrp- and Up-) stemmed from genuine analogical mapping processes
rather than from retrieval strategies. Experiment 2, which was conducted after removing the
second block at test, confirmed this idea by showing that only 26% of the participants became
aware of the studied words to solve problems. This experiment again revealed that putatively
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inhibited (Rp-) solutions were less produced than control (Nrp-) solutions, even when partici-
pants who were aware of the relation between the two experimental sessions were not consid-
ered. This finding supports the idea that memory can influence reasoning unconsciously.
People may attempt to access potential solutions without being aware that their particular
memory state (determined by previous retrieval dynamics) may be guiding the current process
of problem solving. As a consequence, reasoning may be disrupted by a temporary reduced
access to potential solutions in memory.
While a few situational factors might potentially reduce accessibility to relevant information
during problem solving (e.g., short encoding time, blocking by other more salient informa-
tion), the impairment in analogical problem-solving observed in the present experiments may
be understood as an aftereffect of inhibitory control during selective retrieval [26,30,32]. By
this view, inhibition is an adaptive control mechanism that temporarily downregulates com-
peting memory representations to overcome retrieval interference over target memories, with
a wealth of data from behavioral (e.g., [30,48,49]) and brain-related studies supporting this
view (e.g., [50–54]). Hence, if the suppressed information turns out to be later relevant and
access to it is required, impairment in the ability to come up with such information is to be
expected, regardless of the situation requiring its use.
Although an interference-based account of retrieval-induced performance impairment
have been proposed in the context of episodic memory testing [55,56], the main present find-
ing represents a serious challenge for such a view (see also [30,33]). Thus, for example, it has
been proposed that associative blocking rather than inhibition could be the mechanism that
underlies such impairments [56,57]. The idea is that because retrieval practice strengthens the
relation between the retrieval cue and the practiced (Rp+) items relative to the strength of the
unpracticed (Rp- and Nrp-) items, if the cue is presented in a later test, practiced items’ memo-
ries would have a greater probability of being activated and will compete with their related
(Rp-) memories so as to block their retrieval. This account, however, is not able to accommo-
date findings of retrieval-induced performance impairments observed with testing procedures
that do not, either overtly or covertly, allow for the use of the memory cues provided during
the retrieval practice phase (see [30], for a discussion of this issue). As a matter of fact, the sepa-
rate analyses of the performance of the (eight) participants who reported being aware that the
studied/practiced words could be used to solve the problems revealed that thinking back on
these words tended to enhance rather than hinder performance (for related results see [30]).
Hence, since in our experiments (Experiment 2 in particular) participants were tested with
analogical problems and presented with items that were totally unrelated to the practiced
items, it would seem odd to claim that blocking from the more recently processed (Rp+) items
was taking place during the contextually unrelated analogical thinking phase. The implicit
memory nature of the testing procedure of Experiment 2 supports further the interpretation
that it was memory inhibition what hindered analogical problem solving (see [34] for a similar
interpretation applied to verbal creativity). Moreover, the inclusion in the final test of analogies
whose possible solutions were items that had never been presented in the context of the experi-
ment enables us to precise the degree of inaccessibility that selective retrieval may cause on
problem solving. Since participants came up with suppressed (Rp-) solutions as little as they
did with unstudied (unprimed; Up-) solutions, it seems that executive control at retrieval may
downregulate competing memories by rendering them as if they had not been recently
encoded. Thus, while it does not seem to be the case that problem solving may be generally
affected by selective retrieval (Nrp+ solutions were more produced than unprimed Up- solu-
tions), it seems reasonable to put forward that inhibitory control during retrieval may lessen
accessibility of some potential solutions.
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Of course, at first sight, one might have expected generation of Rp- solutions to be even
lower than that of Up- solutions because of inhibitory control. However, it should be noticed
that Rp- items differ from Up- items in that they were previously presented in the context of
the experiment during the study phase (in addition to being the target of inhibitory control).
Hence, Rp- items would enjoy some benefit from this previous exposure (a ‘priming’ effect). If
so, inhibition would be expected to take from them this benefit reducing their accessibility to
the level of non-exposed items. Future experiments where perceptual and lexical priming from
previous exposure is avoided should be conducted to further support this interpretation.
An additional point that deserves attention is that we observed the same pattern of
retrieval-induced impairment with different (strict vs. lenient) scoring procedures, which is
suggestive of how inhibitory control worked during selective retrieval practice. Because the tol-
erant criterion involved accepting as correct items that did not exactly match the studied items
(i.e., synonymous or semantically related words), the fact that participants also solved less Rp-
than Nrp- analogies when considering this less strict criterion suggests that inhibitory control
during selective retrieval not only affects episodic memory, but also may affect general seman-
tic representations (for a similar idea on a related memory inhibition phenomenon (see [58]).
While our main finding unveils the negatives consequences of memory control mecha-
nisms on problem-solving solutions accessibility, previous work has already shown that inhibi-
tory control recruited during problem solving may also have the potential for facilitating
performance by preventing interference of irrelevant information. Thus, for instance, in the
context of creative problem solving, Storm, Angello, and Bjork [59] used a problem-solving-
induced forgetting paradigm in which participants were exposed to cue-response pairs (e.g.,
lick–tongue, sprinkle–rain) and then were asked to solve RAT problems. Critically, half of the
cue-response pairs contained misleading associates for the RAT problems designed to interfere
and cause fixation (i.e., lick, sprinkle, mines) whereas half of the RAT problems did not (i.e.,
manners, tennis, round). Performance in a final cue-response test showed that participants
recalled fewer response words associated with cues that appeared during the problem- solving
phase than response words associated with cues that did not appear during the problem-solv-
ing phase. Thus, attempting to solve a problem caused participants to forget irrelevant infor-
mation in order to deal with interference from competing misleading associates. Similarly,
metaphor processing may share similar features with problem solving suggesting a link
between overcoming interfering irrelevant information and inhibitory control. George and
Wiley [60] conducted a series of experiments using a metaphor-induced lexical forgetting par-
adigm, in which participants studied word pairs composed on potentially metaphoric vehicles
cues and literal associate targets (e.g. SHARK–swim). Then, participants read and interpreted
half of the vehicles as part of metaphoric sentences (e.g. The lawyer for the defense is a shark).
On a test of final recall for all of the initially studied word pairs, participants showed reduced
recall for word pairs consisting of vehicles and their literal associates. These results suggest
that, in order to arrive at the figurative meaning of a metaphor, literal irrelevant associated
information that is previously activated may have to be inhibited. As a consequence of
attempting to retrieve the figurative target meaning from memory, recall for literal informa-
tion is impaired. Therefore, the relationship between memory control processes, such as inhi-
bition, and problem solving may depend on which specific information is the target of control.
If inhibition acts on information in memory that would subsequently have to be retrieved to
generate a solution, worse problem solving performance would be expected. On the contrary,
if inhibition is recruited to suppress activation of irrelevant information that would otherwise
interfere with problem solving, one could predict enhanced performance.
Our main findings might have applied implications, since analogical thinking is thought to
be crucial in a variety of fields ranging from scientific discovery to creative problem solving.
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Despite the fact that analogical reasoning is a desirable tool to tackle real-world problems, a
number of studies have shown that people often fail to use past knowledge to solve a problem
which shares similar features [4,5,25,61]. Since performance can be influenced by how avail-
able certain pieces of information are in our memory, every single thought or mental activity
done immediately before solving a problem might modulate a particular memory state. In fact,
our study suggests that the consequences of certain cognitive operations over memory repre-
sentations may hamper analogical reasoning without noticing it. Although successful retrieval
can facilitate the recall of wanted memories, it can also impair later access to related memories.
In a more naturalistic setting, merely attempting to generate analogical solutions to a problem
by discussing with other people on previous experiences could prevent us from solving the
problem. For example, in a brainstorming session, wherein the main goal is to generate as
many different ideas as possible, overhearing or coming up with some ideas or solutions about
a particular problem might lead to inhibition of potential related solutions or ideas [62]. To
conclude, the modulation of the accessibility of information by means of an inhibitory control
mechanism may have significant effects on analogical reasoning. Our study adds to a growing
body of research to show that unconscious control processes related to retrieval may have an
impact on high-order cognitive operations such as creative thinking [34] or decision-making
[33,47]. Future studies on this topic are required in order to understand the extent to which
unconscious processes may influence our complex behavior.
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